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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that public sector labor relations is best understood in
a framework that focuses on unions' ability to shift demand curves rather than
to raise wages, as is the case in the private sector. It reviews the public
sector labor relations literature and finds that: (i) public sector unionism has
flourished as a result of changes in laws; (2) the effects of public sector
unions on wages are likely to have been underestimated; (3) public sector unions
have a somewhat different effect on wage structures than do private sector
unions; ()compulsoryarbitration reduces strikes with no clearcut impact on
the level of wage settlements; (5) public sector unions have diverse effects
on non—wage outcomes as do private sector unions.
In terms of evaluating public sector unionism, the paper argues that by
raising both the cost of'publicservices (taxes) and the amount of services






Cambridge, MA 02138I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Inthe 1950s only a small minority of public sector workers were
organized and even AFL—CIO President George Meany believed "It is impossible to
bargain collectively with the government."1vjrtually no states had lawsper-
mitting collective bargaining for public employees. Strikes were prohibited.
Analysts of unionism regarded most public sector employees as unorganizable.
In 1980 about 13 per cent of government employees wererepresented by
labor organizations and 32 per cent were covered by contractual agreements.'
Over three—quarters of the states had legislation authorizing collective
bargaining by public employees. Eight states permitted strikes by some public
workers. According to the Current Population Survey (oPs) 3% ofgovernment
employees compared to 22 %ofprivate sector employees were "represented by
labor organizations" in May 198O.
What caused the sudden surge in public sector unionism in the United
States? What are its economic consequences? How have various states and loca-
lities dealt with the organization of their employees? Which laws andproce-
dures have proven more/less successful in coping with the unionism ofpublic
employees? In what ways does labor relations in the public sector parallel
labor relations in the private sector? In what ways has the public sector been
unique?
To answer these questions, I review the results of the past two or so
decades of research on public sector labor relations. The researchrepresents a
significant and expanding effort by labor specialists. In 1960 relatively few
labor relations articles in the leading journals dealt with the publicsector;
in 1983 not only were there numerous public sector articles in the laborjour—2
nals but the field had grown sufficiently to produce two specialized journals,
as well as numerous books and research treatises.5
The review shows that while we have amassed considerable knowledge about
the nature of public sector labor relations, there are noticeable gaps in our
understanding of what public sector unions actually do. The following seven
propositions provide a general overview of the major findings and issues in
public sector labor relations:
1. A fundamental difference between public sector and private sector
collective bargaining is that public sector unions can affect the demand for
labor through the political process, as well as affect wages and work conditions
through collective bargaining. However, the intrinsic political aspect of
public sector bargaining does not necessarily make the demand for public sector
workers more inelastic than the demand for private sector workers, and thus does
not necessarily give public sector unions great economic power. While it is
true that public employers do not face competition in their locality, they are
subject to the discipline of a budget and, in the long run, to exit and entry of
residents and businesses (the Tiebout adjustment). Similarly, while public sec-
tor unions mayhavean advantage in bargaining because they can help elect the
political leaders against whom they negotiate, "legislative vetoes" of neo—
tiated settlements and taxpayers' referenda which limit taxes create potential
weaknesses for unions. Finally, in contrast to private sector unions which are
free to wield the strike threat as a weapon, union power in most public sector
jurisdictions is limited by restrictions on striking.
2. The growth of public sector unionism in the past two decades can be
traced, in large part, to the passage of laws (executive orders) which have3
sought to bring the private sector industrial relations model to the public eec—
tor. In states with laws favorable to unionism, public sector unionism has
flourished; in states without such laws, it has not. General lack of management
opposition to public sector unionism, possibly due to the political power of
unions, has been important for union victories in representation elections in
the public sector. There is some indication that the spurt in public sector
unionism has ended, leaving the U.S. with about a 30—140% union coverage of
public sector labor.
3. Much of the literature concludes that public sector unions have had
relatively modest effects on wages compared to the effects of private sector
unions on wages. This result, if true, would resolve the debate over the rela-
tive strength of unions in public and private employment. A careful reading of
the evidence, however, shows the finding to be questionable on several grounds:
First, many public sector union wage studies looked at unions when they were
Just establishing themselves during a period of public sector expansion. If, as
seems reasonable, the wage effects in first contracts are smaller than in later
contracts and if union wage effects are smaller in booming than in declining
markets, much of the early literature has understated the long term
"equilibrium" impact of public sector unions on compensation. A second problem
with the generalization is that few studies have distinguished between the
effects of public employment se versus effects from the type of occupations
organized in the public sector. Public sector unions include a relatively large
number of white collar workers, whose wages appear to be only moderately
affected by unionism in the private sector. They include protective service
workers, for whom it is difficult to find comparable occupational groups in the4
private sector. The limited studies of union effects on blue collar workers in
the public sector show wage effects similar to those in the private sector. A
thirdreason for questioning the conclusion that public sector unions have weak
wage effects is the likelihood that, because of "comparability" of wages across
cities, there are greater "spillovers" of wage settlements in the public sector
than in the private sector, biasing downward standard cross—section estimates of
the union effect. Finally, for some groups, public sector compensation packages
differ greatly in dimensions not captured in standard data sets. While these
considerations do not necessarily prove the conventional generalization to be
wrong, they suggest it should not be accepted without further investigation.
1. With respect to wage structure, public sector unions have quite dif-
ferent effects on some aspects of wage structure than private sector unions do,
and quite similar effects on other aspects. The teachers' unions appears to
widen educational wage differentials, while policemen and firefighters' unions
appear to have little effect on the range of salaries for their members. This
contrasts with the general equalizing effect of unionism on such differentials
in the private sector. On the other hand, nest studies find that in both the
public sector and the private sector the union impact on fringe benefits is
greater than the union effect on wages, and our analysis of overall inequality
of earnings shows less inequality among union than among nonunion public sector
workers.
5. Despite being illegal in all but eight states, strikes are part of
public sector labor relations. From the 1960s to the l980s, the number of stri-
kes increased drastically until 1 of every 8 strikes occurred in the public sec-
tor.Public sector strikes are generally of short duration. While injunctions5
often fail to halt strikes, there is evidence that the nature of strike laws
affects their frequency. Public sector alternatives to the strike, in the form
of various types of compulsory arbitration, have been successful in reducing
strikes with no clearcut impact on the level of wage settlements. Arbitrators'
decisions show no apparent bias toward one side or the other, despite frequent
claims to the contrary. Final offer arbitration appears to have worked reaso-
nably well, with less of a 'chilling effect' on negotiations than conventional
arbitration, consistent with theory.
6. The limited evidence available on the effects of public sector unions
on productivity shows that unionism is not inimical to productivity. Some stu-
dies find positive union effects, some find essentially nO effects, but few find
negative effects. However, problems of measuring output of public services
make any firm generalization difficult. With respect to public budgets, stu-
dies suggest that unionization does, indeed, increase the share of a
municipality's budget going to the workers in an organized function.
7. Several aspects of market performance have not, as yet, been exten-
sively explored by public sector researchers. These include: the effect of
public sector unions on turnover, which is known to be lower, in general, in
public employment; the net effect of unions on the dispersion of earnings;
the effect of unions on employment and wage responses to cyclical and other eco-
nomic swings; and, most important of all, the effect of unions on the "price"
of output, taxes, property values, and municipal finances in total.
Succeeding sections of this essay provide detailed evaluation of the
research that underlies these seven propositions.6
II.THE NEW UNIONISM
Unionstypically grow in sudden spurts after years of stagnation. As can
be seen in Figure 1, this is true of public sector unions in the United States.
During the mid1960's —early1970's,public sector union membershipsore than
6
uadrup1ed.Thesuddengrowth of public sectorunions was remarkablein that it
occurred during a period of noticeable decline in the organization of the private
sector. It came as a surprise to most observers, who had cited such factors as
the security of public sector work, the high proportion of female, black, and
white collar workers, adverse public attitudes, civil service laws and prohibi—
7 tionson strikes as factors inhibiting organization. Indeed, as late as
February 1959, the AFL—CIO executive council stated that 'in terms of accepted
collective bargaining procedures, government workers have no right beyond the
authority to petition Congress——a right available to every citizen.'8
Table 1 shows that, while some of the newly organized public sector
workers are in unions that are predominantly in the private sector, the majority
of workers are in newly emergent public sector unions. These unions have cer-
tain distinct characteristics. First, in jurisdictional terms, many are more
like craft than like industrial unions, being organized along occupational
lines (i.e., the postal workers' unions, the teachers' unions, the police, the
firefighters, the sanitation workers, and the transit workers). Second, the new
unions have organized an exceptionally large number of "white collar" workers,
even if one excludes the teachers. As Table 2 shows, less than one third of
public sector organized workers are in units covering only blue collar
employees. Thecomparablefigure for private sector workers is a bare 12%.9
Third, in addition to the unions which can and do negotiate and sign collective7























Departmentof Commerce and Department of Labor,
Labor Management Relations in State and Local
Governments, Issues for 1975 —1980(BCDL).
Sources:(1) Directory of National Unions & EE Association, 1979
U.S. Department of Labor, BLS Bulletin 2079.
(2) BLSData —NationalDirectory, 1979 and Statistical
Abstract, various years for employment.8
Table 1: The Public Sector Unions, 1980
Meinbe rsh ip
Teachers
America Federation of Teachers 551,000
National Education Association 1,68)4,000







Fraternal Order of Police 150,000
Stateand Local Government
American Nurses Association 180,000
American Federation of State, 1,098,000
County, and Municipal Employees
Service Employees International (1975) 180,000
Teamsters (1975) 100,000
Laborers (1975) 80,000
Assembly of Government Employees (1975) 600,000
Federal Non Postala




NationalTreasury Employee's Union 53,000
National Association of 50,000
Government Employees (1982 Joined Service
Employment)
International Association of Machinists 7,500
Postal and Federal 29,000—30,000
Postal Unions
American Postal Workers Union 251,000
National Association of Letter Carriers 230,000
Note: Rounded off to nearest thousand.
Source: Bureau of National Affairs, unless otherdse stated, pp.
13—)43. Service Employees International, Teamsters,
Laborers, and Assembly of Government Employees is from
Burton, 1975
aLevitanand Noden, Table 19
Table 2:Jurisdictional Coverage of Public Sector Unions
Percent Covered by Unions
Federal Workers, 1981 61%
Federal Wage Systems (Blue Collar) 86%
General Schedule (White Collar) 514%







In State and Local Contracts, 1976
WhiteCollar Only 142%
WhiteCollar and Blue Collar 27%
Blue Collar Only 31%
Sources: Sar Levitan and Alexandra Noden, p.l
Stateand Local, Tray Table C
Contracts, Mitchell, p. 13010
agreements over wages and fringes and working conditions, there are the sizeable
federal employee unions which do not sign agreements over wages and fringes.
What caused the spurt of public sector unionism in the late 1960's —
1970's?
What changes led to the sudden organization of traditionally non—
unionizable public sector workers?
First and foremost were changes in the laws regulating public sector
unions. In the federal sector, Executive Order 10988 which President Kennedy
announced in 1962, and which was later strengthened by ensuing presidents, was
the principle cause of the rapid organization of federal employees. It provided
for the recognition of federal worker unions but limited the scope of bargaining.
Before 1962 unionization of federal employees was going nowhere; then suddenly,
it shot upward. At the state and local level there were a variety of changes in
the law occurring mostly in the l960's and 1970's (see Table 3), which were
followed by a rapid growth of unionization.The laws favorable to collective
bargaining ranged from weak "meet and confer" laws, to requirements for
bargaining, to compulsory arbitration when resolving disputes.While the
various laws differ among types of employees (i.e. police and firefighters have
different regulations than the teachers), states that have favorable collective
bargaining laws in one area also have them in others, permitting the broad
classification of states in Table 3.
As an example of the rapid change in state laws, consider Massachusetts.
In 1958 it passed a law allowing public employees to join unions but not to
bargain over economic matters. In 196)4, it passed a law requiring bargaining
over work conditions, which was extended in 1965 to include wages, but did not11
Table3: Changes in State LawsRegulatingPublic Sector Unionism
1959 1969 1979
No Law 1, 11
Prohibit Collective 7 3
Bargaining
Bargaining that Permits 5 13 9
"Meet and Confer"
Targainfng Required 1 1
Arbitration/OtherDispute n.a n.a 19
Resolution Mechanism
Source: Tabulated from U.S. Department of Labor State Profiles: Current State
of Public Sector Workers Relations, 1971, 1979.
Numbers for 1979 were calculated from p. 65 of 1979 profile.12
contain any terminal mechanism for settling unresolved issues. In 1974 the
state legislature ordered final offer arbitration to settle impasses. Then,
responding to niinicipalities unhappy with final offer arbitration, the legisla-
ture developed a labor—management committee to resolve impasses through a
variety of mechanisms. In the span of a decade, the state moved from no legal
bargaining to bargaining with a dispute resolution mechanism guaranteeing a
10
contract.
In addition to passing laws which encouraged collective bargaining,
the majority of states instituted public employee relations boards (PERB's) to
hold representation elections among workers and to resolve charges of unfair labor
11
practices.
Studies of the spurt in public sector unionism (see Table 4) uniformly
show that these laws were a major factor in the growth of public sector unioni-
zation. States that enacted laws had rapid increases in unionization in ensuing
years. States that did not had no such growth. The more favorable the laws
were to unions the greater the growth of unionization. For instance, in states
where laws permit strong union security clauses, teachers unions appear to have
done better than in other states. This is not to say that public sector
bargaining does not exist in the absence of a law. Indeed, Ohio is a good
counter example. But one counter example does not disprove a social science
generalization. For the most part, the spurt in public sector unionism was
associated with changes in state laws regulating collective bargaining.
Finally, it should be noted that there is some indication in the growth
curves for public sector union organization that this spurt has come to an end.
From 1972 to 1980 the share of state and local full—time employees with employee13
Table 4: Studies of Impact of Legal Environment
on Public Sector Union Growth and
Determinants of Favorable Laws
Study Group Result
UNION GROWTH
Moore Teachers, cross—state Mandatory bargaining
and time series, 1919— laws help AFT not NEA
1910
Reid and Kurth Public employee unionism, Progressive state
1972—1980 labor law raises
iini cni sm
Dalton Government employees, Mandatory bargaining
1976 laws greatly raise
union density
Reid and Kurth Teacher unionism, Teachers union growth










Ichniowski; Lauer Police unionism, Collective bargaining
1960—1980 laws are a key factor in
in police organization
DETERMINANTS OF LAWS
Faber and Martin Laws on teacher collective Urbanized states and
bargaining those scoring high
(low) on ADA (ACA)
ratings passed laws
earlier
Kochan State public employee Per capita change in




state leads to public
sector collective
bargaining laws14
organizationrepresentation wasvirtuallyunchanged at almost 50 per cent.12
Why Did the New Laws Induce the Spurtin PublicSector Unionism?
The various state public employee labor laws of the mid 1960's —1970's
establishedmechanisms for workers to vote for/against collective representation
and required public sector employees to bargain with them. Both oftheselegal
innovationswere already part of the National Labor Relations Act governing
private sector unionism. They can be viewed as making public employees more
like private employees. Yet unionism in the private sector declined during the
period. One possible reason for the different results is that there was
"pent—up" demand for unionization in the public sector, but not in the private
sector. Another reason, which I believe to be more important, is that public
sector employers have not fought union organization of their workers to the
extent that private sector employers have. As public officials, they cannot
break the spirit or letter of the law, as management can in the private sector.
Hence, the same nominal election procedures produce different results in the two
settings.
Finally, an important issue which must be addressed inany analysis of the
impactof laws on societyis whether the legal changes have a true independent
effect on social outcomes or whether they are simply an intervening or mediating
factor for more fundamental forces. Studies of the variables associated with
passage of laws favorable to public sector collective bargaining show that the
laws have come first in states with high income per capita and a history of
innovations in governmental activity. Some show that these laws are more likely
in states that are highly unionized in the private sector, but others do not.
While detailed analysis of' legislative votes and of the history of key legisla—15
tion is required to determine full causal routes the available evidence suggests
that the laws had an independent effect. Without legislation favorable to
collective bargaining we would not have observed the extensive unionization of
the public sector in United States, at least not to the extent which actually
occurred.16
III. THE NEWSETTING
The public sector differs in several important ways from the private sec-
tor (see Figure 2). Public employers have the sovereign powers of the state;
they generally are monopolies in their local area; they are ultimately respon-
sible to the voting public, including public sector workers; and some produce
essential services (police, fire, and defense).
Do these differences make the private sector industrial relations system
essentially inapplicable to the public sector, or are these differences substan-
tially no greater than the differences between various private industries such as
steel and construction, for example? Do the unique features of the public sec-
tor give unions of governmental employees particularly strong economic power, as
some have alleged?
The Sovereign Power Issue
Among the first objections to public sector unionism was the claim that such
unionism infringes on the sovereign power of the state in determining levels
of services and rules for the behavior of public employees. Surely, it was
argued, one cannot allow public employees, particularly the military, the
police, or fire fighters to have power independently of the elected government.1-3
The counter argumentisthat there is nothing special about employee—employer
relations for most public sector workers. Whyshoulda worker employed in a
private firm under city contract operate under a drastically different labor law
than the equivalent worker in a city owned service?
The sovereignty issue has, for the most part, been resolved by allowing
public sector workers to organize, butby forbiddingmost,particularlythose in
"essential services," from striking. For workers in "nonessential services,"17
Figure2: Industrial Relations System in Public Sector
Compared to Private Sector
Actors Public Sector Private Sector
1.Management Elected officials Managers
Legislative/CityCouncil
voters, through referendum
2. Unions Often white collar Mostly blue
collar
3. Third Party Compulsory arbitration Some mediation
Police, military power some arbitration
of state
4. Workers Usually have some job Workers
security, more likely to
be worse on blacks
Technolor /Market
5. Output Produced Unpriced goods, hard—to-. Priced goods and
measure public goods services for private
consumption/investment
6. Competition Monopoly in local market Competitive markets
in nDstcases
T.Entry&exit Residents and businesses New firms enter!
can move across locales leave given locale
8. Budget Conditions Budget constraint Profits "buffer"
Can change taxes changes in wages
Intergovernmental grants Raise/lower prices
Short—term debt to change revenues
Power
9.Influence on other side Unions can help elect Unions have no
political leaders say in company
policy




11.Illegal Acts Management unfair labor Little penalty






how-ever, actual penalties for strikes are often uxderate, effectively allowing short
strikes (see section v).
The federal government stands in a unique position with respect to
sovereignty. While federal employees are allowed to form unions and negotiate
over working conditions, they do not negotiate over wages and are not allowed to
strike. The high unionization in the federal sector thus provides evidence for
worker desire for representation in a large bureaucratic organization, exclusive
of the "monopoly" power of unions to raise wages through collective bargaining.
The Monopoly! Inelastic Demand Issue
The argument that the nnopoly power which governments have in their juris-
dictioncreates such inelastic demand for public sector employees as to give
public employee unions great economic power was stressed by Wellington and
Winterin their 19T1 book:
•.to the extent union power is delimited by market or other
forces inthe public sector, these constraints do not come into
play nearly as quickly as in the private.
"...soine of these services are such that any prolonged disrup-
tion would entail an actual danger to health and safety.
the demand for numerous governmental services is relatively
Inelastic, that is relatively insensitive to changes In price.
Indeed, the lack ofclose substitutes is typical of many
governmentalendeavors."
I reject this claim for three reasons:
1) In the short run governments face tax and budget constraints that
create a potentially nre rather than less elastic demand for labor. This is
because an employer operating under a budget constraint has no profit "residual"
from which to pay higher wages or in which to put savings from lower wages.
All of the adjustment to changes in wages take the form of an adjustment in
quantities. More broadly, the budget serves as a 'disciplinary' device in the19
public sector as does market demand in the private sector, forcing a quantity
pricetradeoff on the employer.
2) In the long run, cities and states are not really monopolies, since
residents and businesses can move from one jurisdiction to another. Indeed, by
analogywith the factor equalization theorem of trade theory, mobility should
compensate fully for the monopoly power governments have in their jurisdiction.
Citizens unhappy with level of public services can move elsewhere, reducing the
taxable population and thus the ability to pay public sector wages. Mobility
places great constraints on public sector union bargaining power as has been
stressed by Courant, Gram.lich, and Rubinfeld. Moreover, in jurisdictions where
taxation of property raises funds for operation of governments, the capitaliza-
tion of taxes in property values is an additional constraint on public sector
budgets and thus on union ability to raise wages.
3) Where public sector workers are "essential" they are almost a1wars
forbidden to strike which greatly reduces their economic power, as noted
earlier.
The Political Context
The political dimension clearly creates a distinct environment for labor
relations which leads collective bargaining down different paths than in the
private sector. While private sector unions can occasionally alter the demand
for labor curve (through union label campaigns, or by bargaining over employment
as well as wages) the usual assumption is that they alter the cost of labor,
with firms responding by changing the level of employment (see Figure 3A).
Indeed, the standard model of private sector unionism evaluates the monopoly
loss due to unionism in terms of the lower national output because of the reduc—Figure 3:Differences Between Public Sector
and Private Sector Union Effects
A. Private Sector Union Wage Effects
Effect of Unionism is to raise
wage W0 to W1
B. Public Sector Shift in Demand Effects
'NN
Case II: Upward—sloping Supply Curve
Wages







Case I: Perfectly elastic supply curve
Wages
Effect of Unionism is to shift






tionin employment and increased marginal product in the union sector. By
contrast, public sector unions canbe viewedas using their political powerto
raise demand for public services, as well as using their bargaining power to
fight for higher wages (Figure 3B and 3C). A possible criticism of public sector
unionsis that they increase public goods production beyond the social optimum,
raising rather than lowering employment.
Politics,however, is a two—edged sword, and it is by no means clear
whether collective bargaining in a political context increases or reduces union
power. On the one hand, public sector workers are an identifiable voting bloc
and potential activist group in local election campaigns.But so too are tax-
payers. Inthe private market consumers affect wages of workers only indirectly
through shifts in purchases when increased wageslead firms to raise prices.In
the public sector 'consumers' can affect wages directly by electing officials,
passingreferendum and the like which restrict settlements. In virtually every
state, so-called "legislative vetos" can vitiate bargains, as legislatures!
councils refuse to raise the iney to fund signed contracts. For example, in
the l9TOs, despite signed contracts college professors in the University of
Massachusetts system did not receive salary increases for several years because
the legislature did not allocate the funds)5Taxpayer revolts, as evidenced in
proposition 13 (California) or 2J. (Massachusetts), have also been used by oppo-
nents of public spending to limit potential union wage gains by capping tax
revenues or budgets.
In other circumstances unions have effectively used legislature or voter
support to win terms they could not gain at the negotiating table, as the
following case cited by the Labor Management Relations Service indicates:22
A prime example of union use of the referendum to bypass a
municipal employer unreceptive to union demands Is that of the
St. Louis Fire Fighters Local 73, who sought by special elec-
tion to obtain equal pay with policemen. They rang doorbells
and conducted an intensive campaign for votes in homes and
taverns and at barbecues andlaborand political meetings. The
firemen also appealed for votes in newspaper, television, and
radio advertisements. It was estimated that the entire cam-
paign, financed by assessments on members of Local 73, cost
between $35,000 and $50,000. This compared to the $6,000 spent
by the firemen's principal opponent, Mayor Alfonso J.
Cervantes,who campaigned against the raise claiming it would
cost the city $1.7 million for a full year and probably cause a
reduction in the number of fire companies. The firemen,
claiming that these were "scare tactics," prevailed, as the
voters gave the proposal a 61.7 percent majority; it needed
sixty percent to pass.]-6
The term 'multilateral bargaining' is commonly used to refer to the
situation in which public sector unions bargain not simply with those across the
table from them but with other interested public parties as well. In such
bargaining, need for public services, public expenditures, quality of services,
as well as wage packages are often at stake. Neither in theory nor in practice
does multilateral bargaining necessarily improve the union's ability to win wage
gains.
In sum, the unique features of the public sector do, indeed, make it dif-
ferent from the private sector, producing a different industrial relations
system. Careful examination of how these features affect the bargaining power of
the two sides suggests, however, that the relative strength of unions in the
public versus the private sector cannot be resolved by a priori logic. The
issue requires empirical analysis, to which we turn next.23
IV. UNION COMPENSATION EFFECTS
The general tone of studies dealing with the effect of public sector
unionism on compensation is that the effects tend to be small. Indeed, most
survey articles have concluded that "The 'average' wage effect of unionism in
government.., is roughly on the order of five per cent...sinaller than the
average union wages impact in private industry."17"The general effects (of
18
public sector unions) which have been measured are not huge."
This generalization rests on extensive analysis of teachers unions, police
and firefighters organizations, and on studies of the Current Population
Surveys.
The studies vary substantially. Some analyze wages of public
sectorworkers by state, city, or district at a moment in time, using the frac-
tion in a collective organization or having contracts as the "union variable."
Others analyze rates of change in wages over time, looking for an acceleration
in the rate of change after unionization. Some look at wages of individuals on
large data tapes. Others perform before/after comparisons of wage rates.
For the most part, the studies relate to the period from the mid 1960s to the
early or mid 1970s. In this section I review briefly the relevant studies and
examine the evidence and arguments that I believe question the existing
generalization.
The Studies of Teachers
Table5reportsthe results of diverse estimates of the effect of school
teachers unionization on wages, organized bytimeperiod, unit ofanalysis,and
theapproach taken.The results for 1965—1968, which cover the beginnings of

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































did not greatly affect compensation levels. Averaging across all the studies,
the union effect for the early period is a bare 3 per cent. The studies for
l969—l9T',bycontrast, show larger positive union effects, of about 6percent
onaverage. The most recent BaughandStoneanalysis of individuals for19TT
finds very large effects, of 21 per cent in a cross section and 12 per cent in a
before/after framework. Comparing 19Th—19T5 CPS results with 19T8—1979 results
they find a tripling in the union wage effect over time. As a check on this
finding, I estimated their cross—sectional model for 19T3 and 1981 and obtained
a similar result. As a further check, I have also examined the pay of teachers
across states by degree of unionization and also find evidence of a rising union
impact.
There are several possible causes for the increased wage effect of the
teachers union. One likely cause is changed economic conditions. In the
early period the market for teachers was strong, with consequent good wages for
non—union as well as union teachers; in the latter period the market was weak
with the teachers union using its power to offset some downward pressure on
wages. Another hypothesis is that modestly higher differentials in rates of
change of pay per settlement cumulated over time to a sizeable union effect. A
third possibility is that, in fact, the power of the teachers union has risen
because of increased willingness to strike and changes in state laws regulating
teachers collective bargaining. Which, if any, of these possibilities is
correct requires not only a careful analysis of the teachers union wage effect
using comparable data over time (along lines of Baugh-Stone) but also better
measures of union economic power than has been common in studies. Because of
differences in the legal treatment of teachers unions across states and over26
time,simple dichotomous or percentage organized variables are potentially
misleading: two areas with the same"unionization"may have different economic
outcomes because in one area the lawgivesthe union of teachers greater power
than in the other, for instance, by requiring final offer arbitration or
allowing strikes.
Protective Service Workers
The secondmost extensively studied group ofpublicsector unions are the
police and firefighters, for whom the standard study has found moderate effects
inthe area of 5—10 percent (see Table 6). For both occupations, there is a
general finding that effects are larger on total compensation than on wages;
that effects are larger for larger cities; and that effects may vary over time.
The Feuille, Hendricks and Delaney estimates of police union effects over time
show a definite rise from the early 1970s to the rnid—l9TOs, followed by a
decline at the turn of the decade.
There are two possible problems with the studies of union effects among
protective service workers which suggest the 5—10 percent wage effects may
underestimate the actual impact of unionism. The first problem is the not—so
simple matter of measures for pay. All of the studies use reported salary rates
or average salary compensation from the Census of Governments or the
International City Management Association (ICMA) or comparable sources. These
sources value one of the components of compensation which unions appear to
raise——retirement pay—— at current employer cost rather than at the actuarial
value to workers. If, as some claim, the public sector has a bias toward
deferred compensation because politicians have a short time horizon this is
likely to understate the effect of public sector unions. In addition,standard27
Table 6: The Wage Effect of the Protective Service Unions
Firefighters
Year Estimated Effects
of Unions on Pay
1. Ashenfelter '6i—'66




4•Ehrenberg& Goldstein '67 7%
5. Wayslenko '68 12%_11%




2.Ehrenberg & Goldstein '67
3. BartelandLewin '73
1. Hall & Vanderporten '73 3—12%
5. Feuille, Hendricks, '71—'75 5%— 7%
andDelaney '76—'T8 9%—11%
'79—'81 6%— 7%
6. Kearney —Morgan '76 1%
7.Freeman,Ichniowski '76 CS 3%—7%
andLauer "Spillover" 18%
General Municipal and Other
1.Schmenner '62—'70 nounioneffect
2. Freund '65.-'71 no union effect
Note:Hall and Vanderporten figures calculated by dividing coefficients for
mean salary by both minimum and maximum average annual salary scales ($9,925 and
$l2.3l2) in 1973 from Statistical Abstract of U.S. 1976, P. 166.28
datasets ignore other "extra compensation" (days worked at overtime) which are
important in the protective services.
Table '1providesa rough notion of the possible error in analysis due to
thisdata problem. It compares the reported compensation from the Urban
Institute "Twelve City Studies" with the reported compensation from the ICMA in
the same year. The differences are large and suggestive of a sizeable problem
in empirical analysis.
The second potential problem with estimates of the effects of protective
service worker unionism is the possibility of sizeable "spillovers" from union
tononunion cities. Such spillovers are more likely for these occupations than
for others because of the lack of equivalent occupations in the private sector
and the consequent tendency for police and fire fighters to stress pay com-
parability across cities. One admittedly crude way to examine this idea is to
relate wages to unionism in a greater geographic area. Studies which have done
this suggest union wage effects are roughly twice aslargeas the 5—10 percent
thestandard cross—section analysis.19
Additional Groups
Inaddition to the studies of teachers and protective service unions,
there have been a few studies of union wage effects in particular blue—collar
occupations which are directly comparable to those in the private sector. As
Table Sshows,these studies present a very different picture of the relative
economic impact of unionism in the public and private sectors than is indicated
in the earlier literature: even in the early 60s and TOs these studies show no
noticable difference in the wage impact of unions in the two sectors. For some
groups of workers (bus drivers, sanitation workers) the unioneffects have been29
Table 7: Comparison of Pay of Police
ReportedbyICMA and Reported in "Twelve City Study"
International City
Management Association "12 City Study"
City Total Compensation Total Compensation per hour
Per Hour Worked worked (5yearsexperience)
San Franciso l9.1t5 21.99
Los Angeles 21.T6
Philadelphia 13.83 16.147
San Diego 11.37 114.10
apension data not reported to ICMA
Sources: ICMA, tabulated from tapes.
"12 City Study," from E. Dickson and G. Peterson Public Employee
Compensation, The Urban Institute, Table 2.30
Table 8: Effects of Unionism: Public vs. Private Sectors
by Occupation
Result
1. Bus drivers, 1963—71 Unionized drivers in government owned
(Hamermesh) buslines do 3—6% better than those
in private owned lines.
2. Construction workers, 1970 —19T2 Unions in the public sector raise wages
(Hamermesh) 16—25% comparable to increases in the
private sector.
3.Sanitationworkers, 19114 Unionismraises public sector wages
(Edwards and Edwards) by 11—13% compared to 0—5% ifl private
sector.
14•Hospital workers, 1966,69, 72 Unions in the public sector raise wages
(Fottler) by10114% compared to 114—19% in the
privatesector.
5. All Blue Collar and White Unionism raises blue collar wages by
Collar Workers, 1967—77 23% in the public sector compared to 31%
(Moore and Raisian) in the private sector; unionism raises
white collar wages by 6% in the public
sector compared to 14% in the private
sector.
6. All Blue Collar and White Unionism has no effect on white collar
Collar Workers, 1911 wages in public sector or in private
(Shapiro) sector but has a 20% effect on blue
collar wages in the public sector and a
25% effect in the private sector (some
differences for blacks).31
larger in the public sector; in others (construction) they are about the
same in the two sectors; while in others (hospital workers), they are slightly
less in the public sector. Moore and Raisian found in the Michigan Panel Survey
that unionism raised blue collar wages significantly in the public sector and
raised white collar wages more in the public sector. Overall, the evidence in
Table 8 provides an important antidote to the claim that public sector unions
have smaller wage effects than private sector unions because the government is
the employer. If public sector unions have smaller wage effects, it could be
because of the occupations covered.
The Total Work Force
An alternative to the analysis of detailed occupations which occupies much
of public sector labor relations research is to examine the pay of all govern-
ment employees on large data sets. The most important such study, by Sharon
Smith, found that in 1975 government employees in general were paid more than
private sector employees, but that unionism raised wages less for public sector
than for private sector workers, controlling for a wide variety of additional
wage determinants. Using a slightly different model, with fewer controls, I
report in Table 9 similar union results for 1973 and 1981 with, however, evi-
dence of increases in the union impact in some government sectors and decreases
in others. Moore and Raisian's analysis of the Michigan Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics shows greater variation in the public sector union effect over time,
with a drop from the late 1960s (when few were organized) to the early 1970s and
a rising effect thereafter.In the absence of a comprehensive study of various
data sets, definitions of government employees, and different models, the safest
conclusions are that the union effects differ significantly over time and are32
Table9:Effectsof PublicSectorUnions
From Micro Individual Surveys
Current Population Survey





State PubAd. .03 .17
Local Pub Ad .08 .11
Other Non—pub Ad .16
Michigan Panel Survey
(Moore and Raisian)
Averaged froni Moore and Raisian, Table 1
Percentage Union Wage Premium






Source:CPS, tabulated by author using standard log wage equations.
Michigan Panel Survey,Moore and Raisian
aFederaleffect should be zero, and in 1981 the coefficient
isnot statistically different from zero.33
generallysmaller than those in the private sector (for any of the reasons given
earlier but are far from negligible.
Compositionof Compensation
Private sector unions raise "fringe benefits," especially deferred compen-
sation, more than they raise wages, and have sizeable impacts on thestructure of
wages,reducing personal differentials and the overall inequality ofearnings
withinthe union sector. Do public sector unions have the same effects?
Withrespect to deferred compensation there isgood reason tobelieve that
they should have larger effects. First, on the union side, the same arguments
that have been advanced to predict higher fringe spending under unionism in the
privatesector should also hold forthe public sector. Second, as noted on the
employerside, it is argued that politicians with short time horizons should be
especially willing to pay fringes.
Infact, asTable10 shows, all studies find that public sector unions
raisefringe benefits by considerably more than they raise wages, except for
hospital workers. One important consequence of the increased pensions due to
public sector unions Is that public sector retirement funds had assets of 355
20
billion dollars in 1982. It is the size of these funds that underlies the
Rifkin—Barber argument that public sector assets should be invested in the sta-
tes in which the workers live, "to make the north rise again."
What public sector unions do to the structure of wages is less clear. On
the one hand, there is Holmes' evidence that teacher unionism raises the pre-
miums for education and for experience, which runs counter to the private sector
union effect in reducing these differentials. On the other hand, Gustman and
Segal have found that teacher unionism reduces the number of steps in the34
Table 10: Effects of Public Sector Unions
on Composition of Compensation
Group Conclusion
1. Firefighters
(Ichniowski) Union raises spending on fringes by 7%
compared to 4% wage effect.
2. Police
a. Bartel and Lewin, Union raises spending on fringes by 8—
17% compared to 6—12% wage effect.
b. Feuille Union raises spending on fringes by 12%
compared to 5—10% wage effect.
c. Feuille, Hendricks, Unionized cities have fringe benefits
and Delaney 20—30% higher than union cities,
compared to roughly 5—11% for wage
effect
3. Teachers
a. Holmes Teacher union raises premium for educ-
ation andforexperience
b. Moore Teachers union reduces secondary
school/elementary school premium by 6%.
c. Gustman & Segal Teachers affect pension levels
substantially for those with less than
25 years of experience (48%) but not
those with imre experience.
4. Sanitation Unions raise spending on fringes by 27
(Edwards& Edwards) —43% comparedto 9—22% wage effect.
5.HospitalWorkers
a. Becker Unionization has moderately greater
effectson fringes than on salaries.
b. Feldman & Scheffler Unionization increased fringes about 6%
while wages increased 8—12% in a hospi—
talwith 50% of employees unionized.
c.Cainet.al. Unions had a large effect on fringes
buta small and statistically
insignificant impact on wages.35
salary structure, which reduces inequality, and Moore reports a reduction in the
secondary teacher—elementary teacher differential in Nebraska. The various stu-
dies of the effect of firefighters and police give a mixed picture of the union
impact on minimum versus maximum salaries. Some studies find larger effects on
minimums than on maximums but not by very much, while others find
smaller effects.
To get an overall picture of how public sector unions affect the structure
of personal differentials and inequality, I bave made a preliminary analysis of
Current Population Survey data in 1973 and 1981. Taking non—federal government
workers as a whole, I find a lower standard deviation of log wages among those




Inaddition, I find that separate regressions for the wages of the two
groups show:
1. Smaller effects of education in the union setting, particularly in
1973;
2.Smaller effects for sex in the union setting, especially in 1981,
implying a greater union impact on female than male wages; this result is
consistent with Sharon Smith's analysis, which showed larger union effects on
female than on male wages;
3. Slightly positive effects of being black in the union setting, com-
pared to slightly negative effects of being black in the nonunion setting,
implying a larger union Impact for blacks than for whites;
14 A mixed pattern of age effects on wages, different from that found36
inthe private sector.
The finding that public sector unionism reduced sex differentials is but
one indication of union efforts to equalize pay between the sexes. In what is
perhaps the nst important development in public sector wage determination in
decades, AFSCME has won, in federal court, increases in the wages of female
workers in the state of Washington of 31 per cent and upwards, to bring about
"comparableworth."According to theruling in District Court, from 1983to
1985, the state nust bring wages for workers in predominantly female Job classi-
ficationsup to levels paid to workers in predominantly male occupations that
require comparable skill, responsibility and working conditions. AFSCME brought
the original suit after ten years of trying to get the state to comply with the
findings of the states' own comparable worth studies. It has been estimated
that the raises will bring about $200 million to affected employees over the two
22
years arid $500 million in back pay to about 15,000 workers, mostly women.
Unless the decision is reversed on appeal the landmark pay equity ruling may
revolutionize pay practices in the public sector.
Wages and Employment in a Macro Context
With about 15% of the work force employed in the public sector, the extent
to which public sector wages and employment vary over business cycles and in
response to secular changes has important macro—economic implications. At one
point many analysts believed public sector labor markets to be less responsive
23
to economic conditions than private sector markets. The sharp increase in
relative wages and employment of public workers in 1960s and decreases in pay
(and incomes, employment) in the 1970s calls into question this generalization.
During the l9TOs—1980s the federal government broke from its stated corn—37
para'bility policy to grant smaller pay increases than those in the private sec-
tor, raising the possibility that in times of stagflation public sector wages
are more responsive to conditions. I know of no significant study of the macro-
economics of public sector wage and employment responsiveness to inflation, nor-
mal business cycle swings, and abnOrmal changes. Such an investigation should
be clearly tied to public finance studies of cyclical/secular/abnormal changes
in federal, state and rarnicipal finances and to variations in sales/income and
property tax legislation across state rainiclpalities.38
V. NON—WAGE EFFECTS
Analysis of the non—wage effects of private sector unions have followed
two lines of research. The classic Slichter, Healy & Livernash book, The
Impact of Collective Bargaining in Management presented the results of 100 or
so case studies concerned with changes in personnel practices, management and
productivity.More recently, labor economists have used ndern quantitative
tools to estimate the effects of unions on turnover, job satisfaction, pro-.
ductivity, capital/labor ratios, and profits. 24
Is it reasonable to expect public sector unions to have as significant
effects on non wage outcomes as private sector unions have?
Because of the unique features of the public sector environment, the
answer varies depending on the outcome. Since turnover is often low in the
public sector in the absence of unions, one would expect only marginal
effects on quits andlayoffs.As productivity is often said to be lower in
the public sector than in the private sector in the absence of unions, there may
be more room for positive union productivity effects. Because of civil service
rules, there may be less union impact on personal policies, but because of mana-
gerial inefficiency, there may be more. Finally, the effect of unions on the
public sector equivalents of profit and prices——taxes, bond ratings, and pro-
perty values——will be large or small, depending on the power of the unions to
raise budgets, which can be determined only empirically.
Research on the effects of public sector unions on non—wage outcomes is
limited, but the topic is important and deserves as muchattentionasthe more
heavily researched topics ofcompensationand arbitration—strike issueswhich
respectively precede and succeedthis section.39
In this section I review the relevant findings on non—wage outcomes arid
what they suggest may result from a more complete analysis.
Etiployment and Budgets
In the private sector it is universally accepted that one of'thesubstan-
tial responses to union wage effects is a reduction of employment. As noted in
section 2, this is questionable for the public sector, as lobbying for higher
budgets could raise employment as well as wages. The empirical evidence sup-.
hi o'hr rr 1 vr+1 mrsl f 4 D
collectivebargaining. In the mostcomprehensivestudy of ICMA data for 1400
citiesover a decade, Zax has estimated that public sector unionism raises
employment by about io% Victor found essentially no change in employment for
police and increases in firefighters employment under unionism. Benecki found
increases in employment in small cities but reductions in very large cities, for
reasons that are not clear. In a highly sophisticated analysis, Iriman reports
higher employment for both police and firefighters under unionism, but a negative
union wage effect for police. As his model is a complex multi—equation system
with endogeneous unionism, itisunclear whether these results come from the
dataor from the particular structure imposed on the data.
If unions have a positive or non—negative effect on employment without
controlling for wages, and iftheyraise wages, then budgets in organized Juris-
dictions should be higher than in unorganized jurisdictions. Indeed, four stu—
26
dies of the impact of unionism on size of budgets show such effects. Moreover,
the evidence by Ebert for the impact of specific contract items on the alloca-
tion of dollars to use categories among New York school districts shows that the
effect of collective contracts on expenditures can be studied in terms of the40
costof specific contractual points.
The analyses of the relation between unionism and employment and budgets,
while consistent with our general theme of public sector unions' raising demand
for labor, should not be viewed as complete. With the exception of Inman, who
estimates a complete structural modelwithendogenous unionism, and Zax, who
estimatesa demand curve for labor, uzich of the analysis of union impacts on
employment and budgets is unconnected to the analysisof unionwage effects.
Noneof th stndi derniat1vnod1 th budQt rrncas It intrr1trrnto ____,______tI—--—--——— C———— —————————— ——
taxes,inter—governmental grants, or debt financing. In contrast to the studies
of compensation, none of the studies provides a before/after test of findings.
Whatislacking, and needed, is a consistent analysis of the full effects of
public sector unionism on labor costs, employment and finances.
Productivit
Despitethe difficulty of measuring the output of many-publicgoods, there
have been a surprisingly large number of studies on the relation between
unionization in the public sector andproductivity.Some of the studies have
followed the Brown—Medoff production function methodolor for analyzing union
impacts on productivity. Others have used quite different methods, ranging
from case studies to analyses of manager (worker) perceptions of productivity
effects to simple comparisions (correlations) of productivity indices with
measures of unionism.
Table 11 presents a brief summaryofthe studies. It gives the group
covered, method of analysis, and finding. Rabid opponents of public sector
unionism will be surprised to find that there is little evidence that public
sector unions adversely affect productivity. Of the 11 studies in the table,41
Table 11: Effects of Unionization of Productivity in PublicSector
Method Finding*
1. Stanley Case study of 19 state and
local governments. Analyzes
union impact on personnel
administration, work super—
vision, and financial manage
ment by reviewing interviews,
government reports, bargaining
outcomes, and press reactions
from 1968—69.











by increasing costs and
impeding the use of
flexible management.
2. Coulter Discriminant analysis for
firefighters of 3214 munlcipa—
lities with populations
25,000 and over. Uses total
cost (property loss from
fires plus expenditures) per









police calculated for each
yearfrom 1971—80 and for 8
typesof crimes. Outputs were
measured as reported crime
rates and the rate of crimes
cleared by arrests.
Unions decrease crime
rate but effect is
unstable, depending on
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asnumber ofinterlibrary











public transit in Western
U.S., 1917. Service
effectiveness is measured
by revenue passengers per











inspectors in 1970. Output is
measured as number of building




The effects were often
negative but not sta-
tistically significant.
7. Salkever Regressions for hospitals
measuring the cost of hospital




5—9% with most of increase
from nonwage sources.
8. Gallagher Management and local union
representatives assessment by
questionnaire for 117 hospi-
tals in a Canadian province
during l9TOs. Measures of
impacts used fall into it cate-
gories: economic, employer
attitudes and behavior, mna—





Job evaluation correlation for
firefighter officers by inter-




perhaps due to some




Regressions for state govern-
ments, 19714—75 using surveys,
interviews, and various secon-
dary sources. Output is
measured as the level of state
productivity improvement effort.
Strong positive impact by
unions.
11. Eberts Regression analysis of teachers
in mid—1970's for factors






less time in instruction but






sixshow essentially no union effect, three report positive effects of varying
strength while three report negative effects. Each study hassizeableproblems.
withoutput measures; for example, the Ehrenberg-Schwarz study, which concluded
that unionism had essentially no effect on productivity, found a positive effect
onoutput for one measure, interlibrary loans; and the Feullie et.al study,
which I categorize as showing positive productivity effects, found no effect on
crime clearance rates. Also, there were problems with the structure of the
models, especially concerning the control variables and the routes by which
unionism affects output. These results are therefore hardly strong enough to
warrant a firm generalization. They do, however, reject the presumption that
public sector unionism necessarily has adverse effects on productivity, and
suggests that, if there is a general effect, it n.y very well be positive. At
the least, the evidence backs the weak generalization offered by Methe and Perry
in the Public Administration Review that "collective bargaining has had no
(negative) impact on the effectiveness of local services."27
Personnel Practices
Perhaps the most important way unionism affects the operation of enterpri-
ses is to force firms to alter their personnel practices. Rules replace n.na—
gerial discretion in a wide variety of decision areas. Grievance and
arbitration procedures give workers "due process" at the work place.
A priori it is difficult to predict whether public sector unions would
have a larger or smaller effect on personnel practices than private sector
unions. On the one hand, civil service regulations, tenure laws for teachers,
and the like provide some protection for the majority of public sector workers,
thus limiting the scope for unionism. On the other hand, public sector manage—44
ment is allegedly inefficient and full of political decision—making which
increases the need for explicit personnel practices and grievance machinery.
While there has been no definitive summaryofpersonnel practices before/after
unionism or practices between union/nonunion areas, the available literature
suggests that unions have had a sizeable impact on personnel practices, with
contractual protection generally superceding civil service or other legal pro-
tection. The Carpenter and Ashworth study of personnel practices in Mississippi
found that many non—union cities diverged noticeably from the Civil Service
model, even to the extent of failing to have explicit job definitions. The
Beyer, Trice and Hunt study of supervisory policies in the federal government
found that unions have positively affected supervisors' use of management—
initiated policies regarding alcoholism. In his 19T2 study, Stanley found that
"most department heads interviewed——said that this union pressure is good for
both employees and management,"2 result consistent with Slichter, Healy and
Livernash's work on the private sector. In the federal government, where
contracts deal solely with work conditions, Levitari and Noden rejected "the myth
that worker rights and collective bargaining are contrary to efficiency."2n
his analysis of hospitals in Canada, Gallagher found that both management and
union agreed that unionization forced regular and professional personnel prac-
tices onto the institutions.
In terms of econometric research, several analysts have sought to evaluate
the effects of unionism on personnel practices by coding collective bargaining
contracts according to whether or not specific provisions favor the union or the
management. Kochan, Gerhart and Feullle et al. found that in states where
public sector labor laws are most favorable to unionism, contracts have been45
titledin favor of workers, as one wouldexpect.Ebertshas analyzed thecost
impact of personnel practices embodied in contracts in New York City schools,
and found that those relating to labor jurisprudence and grievance categories
were costly to management.
Each of the various public sector occupations have different personnel
practice issues. In teaching, one issue relates to the extent to which state
law on tenure can be overriden y collective bargaining contracts. Courts have
decidedthe issue differently in different states. Another important issue
relates to the power of principals to assign/layoff teachers. If and when
schooladministrations push for merit pay, that will certainly become a major
issue in bargaining. Among police and firefighters, key personnel issues have
included: parity, pay, and manning issues. For sanitation and various blue
collarpublic sector workers, the issueof subcontracting to private sector
organizationshas been important andtheevidence suggests thatunionshave
managed to reduce contracting out.
No good estimatesexist of the extent to which contracts trade—off per-
sonnel practices and related non compensation conditions for compensation.
Revenue4 Taxes,and Welfare
If unions raise public sector budgets, then they necessarily raise the
need for revenue and thus taxes, inter—governmental transfers, or debt. A con-
sistent ndel of union impacts on the public sector requires investigation of
these effects as well as those on wages, employment and budgets. Unfortunately,
until recently, there has been little investigation of the effect of public sec-
tor unions on budgets and taxes (one exception is Benecki's 19T8 study, another
is Levy's 19814 bachelor's degree thesis work) and none on the consistency bet—46
veen the various estimates of union effects on compensation, budgets,
employment, and productivity.3This is a majorshortcoming in the research for
both substantive and nthodological reasons. Substantively, failure to
demonstrate a union impact on "bottom line" issues like taxes and
municipal/state debt seriously hampers anysocialevaluation of public sector
unionism. Methodologically, failure to analyze union impacts on all of the
diverse outcome variables results in a loss of information and less efficient as
well as possibly biased estimates of key parameters.
Still, on the basis of the existing estimates of the effect of unions on
employment, wages and budgets described earlier, it is likely that public sector
unions raise both taxes and public services above what they would be in the
absence of the unions.
Does this mean that there is a social welfare loss due to excessive
public goods resulting from unionism?
In the absence of a generally accepted theory or empirical results on
whether a democratic government over—or under——produces public goods, no answer
can be given to the question.In analysis of private sector unionism, second—
best considerations may weaken our belief in the standard welfare evaluation of
the output loss due to union wage effects, but does not lead us to reject it.
For the public sector, the problem of evaluating whether the average citizen
would be better/worse off in the absence of public sector union lobbying for
public goods is sufficiently complex to leave one agnostic. If, as Gaibraith
argued in The Affluent Society, there is a tendency to under produce public
goods, the union pressures may be socially beneficial. If, by contrast, the
conservative fear that there are inherent tendencies to over—produce public47
goods are correct, public sector unions are on the wrong side of the social
welfare ledger. Perhaps theories of actual output decisions in the public sec-
tor, as opposed to the normative theory of public goods production, can help us
determine whether or not the potential expansion of output in the public sector
dueto public sector unionism is socially good or bad.
To sum up, just as private sector unions have significant non—wage
effects,so too do public sector unions. In the private sector some of these
effects —— lowerturnover, more professional management——help raise produc—
tivity to counter—balance union wage effects, at least in part. In the public
sector some of the effects of political lobbying seems to operate in the direc-
tion of increasing expenditures on output of public goods. Analysis of the non—
wage effect of public sector unions, particularly on taxes and overall municipal
finances has been relatively sparse, but offers some suggestions for evaluating
public sector labor relations and for future research.48
VI. IMPASSE RESOLU'rION
A major policy andresearchissue in public sector labor relations con-
cerns which rules and institutions should be used to resolve disagreements about
terms of contracts, and concurrently how to treat strikes. The various state
legislatures and municipalities have experimented with a wide variety of mecha—
nisms for impasse resolution. Eight states have legalized strikes for some
public sector workers, thereby letting the traditional private sector battle of
economic strength or threat thereof serve as the ultimate pressure for
agreements. Many states make public sector strikes illegal, some with rather
severe penalties for strikers. In recent years a sizeable number of states have
opted for conventional or final offer binding arbitration as a means for
achieving settlements in the absence of strikes.
In this section I examine what we have learned about public sector strikes
and arbitration substitutes for the strike.
Public Sector Strikes
Strikes have a bad press. No one really likes them. But in a system of
free collective bargaining they serve an important function. Without the
strike, or some substitute form of economic weapon, labor might never be able to
force management to take its demands seriously, and management might never be
able to force workers to withdraw demands/give concessions.
Despite being outlawed in most jurisdictions, strikes in the public sector
are far from rare. As Table 12 shows, the country has experienced a sizeable
number of public sector strikes. Indeed, between 196O—64 and 1976—80, the
number of stoppages in the public sector rose from 32 per year to 500 per year.31
Public sector strikes differ in their basic dimensions from private sector49
Table 12: Selected Work Stoppage Measures
All Industries arid Government, 1979
Item All Industries Total State Local
Days of idleness as a
percent of estimate 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.10
total working time
Workers involved as a
percent of total 1.9 1.6 1.14 2.2
employment
Average number of workers
involvedper stoppage 358 1428 853 383
Average days of idleness
per worker 20.1 11.7 10.6 12.0
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work Stoppages in Government, 1979. March
1981, Report 629, Table 2.50
strikes. They are of much shorter duration but tend to involve re workers per
strike. According to Nelson, Stone andSwintthey follow a different cyclical
pattern than private sector strikes, falling rather than rising in business
expansions.
Just as the various states have adopted different laws regulating collec-
tive bargaining in the public sector, so too have they developed different laws
regulating strikes. Eight states permit strikes (see Table 13). Some have no
explicit regulations but outlaw strikes under Judicial interpretation. Others
outlaw strikes with varying penalties for strike breakers—-penalties which are
sometimes not enforced.
Which of these legal treatments is most successful in limiting strikes?
Is it better to make strikes legal, to have harsh penalties, or to have moderate
penalties? What is the effect on states of a collective bargaining statute
which compels unresolved issues to be settled by conventional or last offer
arbitration?
There have been a sizeable number of studies of these questions (see Table
i1).Themost notable and consistent finding is that compulsory arbitration
does, indeed, serve as an effective deterrent to strikes. Several studies have
found a curvilinear relation between public sector labor laws and strike
incidence, with states having weak "meet and confer" laws being more strike
prone than states with no comprehensive public sector labor relations law and
those with compulsory arbitration having the fewest number of strikes.
32
Whatever good or ill effects compulsory arbitration has on bargaining and
settlements, it does, nevertheless, limit strikes.
By contrast, studies which fail to distinguish between types of public51
Table 13: Statutory- Regulation of Strikes by State, 19T9





Strikes of some public sector workers not treated in law but regarded as illegal
by courts (12 states)
Arizona
Colorado None
Idaho Silent for teachers, firefighters prohibited Illinois Strikes are illegal and striking employees may
be fired.
Louisiana Police officers can't strike; labor organizations
violating may be fined $500; otherwise silent
Mississippi None
New Mexico Silent; state employees prohibited and may lose























Washington Prohibited; uniformed employees fined up to $250
perday.52
Table 13 (Continued)
Heavy Penalties (15 States)
Delaware Prohibited; union recognition revoked for two
years, dues deduction for one. Penalties are
mandatory
Florida Prohibited; court may enjoin and may fine
union up to $5,000 for contempt and union
officers $50—$100 per day; employer may
recover damages. Employee may be dismissed or
put on probation for six nnths. Union may
lose certification or dues deduction and nay
be fined up to $20,000 per day for each day of
strike.
Georgia Prohibited; dismissal with 3 year ban on
rehiring; no salary increase for 3 years and 5
year probation; inciting a strike is a mis—
demeanor punishable by up to 1 year imprison-
ment, a fine of $100—bOO, or both.
Indiana Prohibited; employer may sue for injury or
damage.Union losesdues deduction privilege
forone year. Employee may not be paid for
dayson strike.
Iowa Prohibited; court may enjoin and fine up to
$500 per individual or $10,000 for union for
each day or violation and/or six nxnths impri-
sonment. Individual may he fired and not
rehired for one year.
Maryland Prohibited; recognition revoked for two years.
Dues deduction suspended one year. Penalty
mandatory.
Nebraska Prohibited; violators guilty of class 1 mis-
demeanor.
Nevada Prohibited; strike may be enjoined. Union may
be fined $50,000 per day, union leader $1,000
per day or jailed. Employer can dismiss, or
suspend, or demote worker, cancel collective




State Year of Statute Statutory Sanctions
New York Prohibited; one year probation and loss of two
days pay for each day on strike. Union loses
dues deduction. Employer may seek injunction.
Ohio Prohibited; termination possible. One year
freeze on salary if rehired plus two year pro-
bationary period.
Oklahoma Prohibited; union loses recognition. Employee
man not be paid for strike. Police and fire
may be fixed or dismissed.
South Dakota Prohibited; union fined to $50,000, employee
$1,000 or jailed up to one year or both.
Employer can seek injunction.
Tennessee Prohibited; employer may seek injunction; employees
may be dismissed or forfeit tenure for 3 years.
Texas Prohibited; employee dismissed, loses
reemployment or other benefit rights. Fines
for police and fire. No wage increase for 1
year.
Virginia Prohibited; employee dismissed, no rehirement
possible for one year.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Summary of Public Sector Labor Relations
Policies, 1979.54
Table 114: Findings in Empirical Studies
Of Public Sector Strikes
Study (year) Grip Finding
1. Balfour & Holmes teachers across states States with permitted






2. Klauser Hawaii impasse procedures Only one strike;
1971 —1977 legalization limits
strikes
3. Stern & Olson teachers, police, and Propensityto strike
firefighters during negotiations
1975 —1977 is lowest with compulsory
arbitration, highest
with no bargaining law
14.Wheeler firefighters strikes Compulsory arbitra—
1969 —1972 tion laws reduce
strikes







6.Rodgers same as Burton & Krider making strikes ille—
19714—1975 gal and third
party procedures
reduce strike
7.Ichniowski police compulsory arbitra—
1972—1973, 1976—1978 tion reduces strikes
8.Horn,McGuire teachers stikes across Districts that engage









9.Fallon all state public sector Compulsory arbitration
strikes 1972 procedures have no sigriif 1-.
cant effects or very
minor ones.
10. Colton teachers strikes 1960-. norelation between
1975,cross-states strikes and
bargaining statute
11. Weintraub and teachers strikes over timeDistricts with
Thornton 1946—1973 permIssive bargaining
legislation have more
strikes.56
sector bargaining laws yield mixed results, possibly because of the existence
of cases where bargaining laws without compulsory arbitration increase strikes
and partly because of cases where compulsory arbitration laws reduce them
(for example, Colton versus Weintraub and Thornton among teachers).
The findings with respect to strike laws se are also less clear.
Balfour and Holmes found strikes most frequent in states with very harsh
penalties and in those with no penalties, and least in those with moderate
penalties. Fallon found strikes less frequent in those with no penalties.
Klausercited the HawaIiexperience as showIng that legalizatIon of strIkes
reducesthem,presumably because of the greater pressure on management to reach
agreement with workers.
Douglas' study of New York's Taylor law shows that public officials are
loathein manyinstancesto impose the penalties of the law, which includes a
two—for—one pay penalty for each day on strike, loss of checkoff of dues,and
which requires workers to go back to their jobs immediately. From 196T—782T2
illegal work stoppages produced only 1T3 charges of illegal activity, and 136
injunctions.In several instances the disputes produced exceedingly bitter
labor—management relations which might have been avoided under a different
collective bargaining law. In this regard the Zimmer—Jacobs study of New York
prison guard strikes suggests that the greatest problem of a punitive strike law
is the danger that it exacerbates disputes, rather than helps resolve them.
Finally, in light of the longstanding sovereignty issue in public sector
labor relations, one mist not forget that in a number of cases, governors and
the President have used the National Guard or the arrr to break illegal public
sector strikes. The most notable such recent case was President Reagan's use of57
Air Force traffic controllers to defeat PATCO and ultimately crush that union.
In the l970s, the National Guard was used to temporarily replace striking public
sector workers by both liberal and conservative governors. The likelihood of
such force being used may be an important deterrent to protective service stri-
kes, which may be rendered largely ineffective as a result.
Binding Arbitration
A major research effort has been devoted to the consequences of compulsory
arbitration,either conventional or final offer, on public sector labor rela-
tions.The theory of conventionalarbitration has focused onthe "chilling"
effect that such third party resolution can have on negotiations. In the most
often argued analysis, if two parties operating under a conventional arbitration
statute believe the arbitrator will "split—the—difference," negotiations will be
chilled, as each side will refuse to make concessions for fear they will lower
its award in arbitration. By contrast, final offer arbitration——under which the
arbitrator must pick one of the two offers——is claimed to have less of a
chilling effect. In a rigorous model Crawford has shown that in fact in a world
without uncertainty, but with multiple issues in which parties expect
arbitrators to split the difference, the two forms of arbitration may yield the
same result, and are unlikely to be Pareto efficient.
The major criticism leveled against final offer arbitration is that it
provides identifiable winners and losers which Is bad for labor relations. In
New Jersey and Massachusetts——two extensively studied states——unions have tended
to win approximately 2/3rds of the arbitration awards, leading to considerable
complaint by cities.331femployers and unions had equally realistic final
offers, and arbitrators make decisions close to union offers most of the time,58
the cities wouldhavea legitimate gripe. In fact, however, Ashenfelter and
Bloomhave found that the reason unions win more in New Jersey is that union
offers are more realistic perhaps because union leaders are more risk—averse
than municipal officials, they even find that final offer arbitration produces
smaller settlement than conventional arbitration.
Finally, as noted in our previous discussion of strikes, there has been
considerable concern about the extent to which compulsory arbitration laws
reducestrikes, particularly compared to laws that make collective bargaining
illegal or that simply penalize public sector strikes.
Whenthe issue of binding arbitration initially surfaced in the public
sector literature, there was a notable lack of empirical evidence on its
effects. As Table 15 shows, by- 1981, 18 states had some form ofbinding
arbitration, 8 of whom relied exclusively on conventional arbitration, and 10
of whom experimented with some form of final offer arbitration. While binding
arbitration has been invoked for nearly all workers, it has been most widely
used to deal with the problems of protectiveservice employees.
Analysisof the effects of the laws on negotiations and wages has taken
various forms: before/after studies within states; cross—section comparisons
between groups that are covered by the arbitration provision with those that are
not; comparisons of arbitration awards with negotiated settlements; and labora-
tory experiments designed to evaluate how various dispute resolution mechanisms
affect negotiations.
Because the presence of compulsory arbitration dispute resolution
may affect negotiations, the most problematic of the approaches is to compare
the wages deterained by arbitration with those set in negotiations. This is59
Table 15: Compulsory- Arbitration Laws, 1980
Covered Employees Arbitration
Alaska Law enforcement, fire— Conventional
fighters, prison, hospital
Connecticut Municipal employees and Final offer,
teachers Issue by issue
Hawaii Firefighters Final offer
Iowa All Final offer, issue
by issue
Maine State Conventional
Massachusetts Police and firefighter Final offer
Michigan Police and firefighter Final offer on eco-
nomic issues, con—
ventional on others
Minnesota All (with some minor Final offer, issue by
exceptions issue
Nebraska All except teachers Conventional
Nevada Firefighters Final offer
All Conventional or final
offer
New Jersey Police, firefighters, prisonFinal offer or
conventional
New York Police and firefighters Conventional
New York City All Conventional
Oregon Police, firefighters, retailConventional
hospital, prison
Eugene, Oregon Public safety Final offer by
issue
Pennsylvania Guards, courts, police Conventional
and firefighters
Rhode Island State Conventional, not
binding on wages
Police and firefighters Conventional
Teachers Conventional
Washington Police and firefighters Conventional60
Table 15 continued




Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Management Services Administration.
Summary of Public Sector Labor Relations Policies, 1981.61
because, as Farber and Katz point out, the presence of a binding arbitration
provision n.y change negotiations as well, depending on the nature of the
arbitrator's preference function. In addition, the selection of jurisdictions
into arbitration creates potential "selectivity bias" problems.
Table 16 summarizes current findings of the effects of compulsory- arbitra-
tion on economic outcomes. First, as noted earlier, binding arbitration defini-
tely- reduces strikes. With respect to bargaining, the issue is unresolved.
Some analysts conclude that conventional arbitration has harmed bargaining.
Others claim that it does not. Some have argued that once two parties get
involved with arbitration, there is a "narcotic effect," in which they- keep
coming back for more arbitration rather that proceeding to bargain. Others have
argued that the effect is illusory rather than real. As the Butler and
Ehrenberg and Kochan—Baderschneider debate in the ILRR makes clear, it is dif-
ficult to isolate "true" state dependence from unobserved characteristics that
cause this behavior. While the overall impact of arbitration on bargaining is
unclear, the general expectation that "final offer" arbitration will be less
chilling than conventional arbitration seems, for the most part, to be supported
in the data.
There is no clear conclusion in the literature regarding the impact of
compulsory arbitration on wages. Several studies of varying quality- conclude
that compulsory arbitration raises ges while others, also of varying quality,
conclude it does not. The most sophisticated study, by Ashenfelter and Bloom
finds final offer arbitration does not produce higher wage settlements than does
conventional arbitration, despite rainicipal complaints to the contrary (ir
any-thing,the data show slightly lower settlements in New Jersey.62
Table 16: Effects of Compulsory Arbitration
on Economic Outcomes
A. Effects on Bargaining
Compulsory Arbitration Reduces Bargaining
1. Wheeler —Conventional,firefighters. Management bargainers are less
likely- to change positions on starting wages when compulsory arbitration
laws exist. Also, there is a greater gap between party and impasse
positions.
2. Kochan and Baderschneider —Conventional,New York firefighters and
Police. Parties have a high and increasing rate of dependence on 3rd
party- arbitration.
3. Lipsky- and Barocci —FinalOffer, Massachusetts firefighters, police and
teachers. Measured as proportion of negotiations that resulted in
impasses.
14•Somers —Finaloffer, Massachusetts firefighters and police. Final
offer arbitration led to increased reliance on 3rd party arbitration.
Didn't lead to increase of pre—impasse bargaining.
Compulsory Arbitration Does Not Reduce Bargaining
1. Grodin —conventional,Nevada
2. Loewenberg —Conventional,Pennsylvania police and firefighters. Two—
thirds of municipalities that negotiated arrived at negotiated
settlement.
3. Gallagher and Pegnetter —Finaloffer, Iowa. Final offer arbitration
encourages negotiations.
liP.Long and Feuille —Finaloffer, Eugene Oregon. Case study of 7
negotiation—arbitration experiences since 1911. Moderate encouragement
of bargaining.
5. Lipsky and Barocci —Finaloffer, Massachusetts firefighters, police and
teachers. Measured by number of cases settled by arbitration.
B. Effects on Wages
Compulsory Arbitration Raises Wages
1. Loewenberg —Conventional,Pennsylvania police arbitration resulted in
larger increases than in negotiations or employer determinations.
2. Stern, Rehrnus, et. al. —Finaloffer, Wisconsin and Michigan.
Regression analysis shows weak evidence of a positive relation for
firefighters and police inOboth states from 1 —5%.63
Table 16 (continued)
3. Olson —Conventional,firefighters for population of 100,00 and over.
14 Kochan and Jick —Policeand firefighters in New York state. The
natureof the impasse procedure —factfindingor arbitration —hada
positive impact for management salary but no movement for union
salaries.
Compulsory Arbitration Does Not Raise Wages
1. Somers —Finaloffer, Massachusetts. Final offer arbitration leads to
excessive percentage wage increases.
2. Bloom —NewJersey. None of coefficients for arbitration was signifi-
cantly different from zero in regression analysis with salary changes as
dependent variable.
3. Ashenfelter and Bloom —NewJersey, Final offer arbitration has less effect
than conventional.
4. Loewenberg —Firefightersmedian increase in salary is similar to that
for negotiated settlements or for decisions determined by an arbitration
award.64
Finally, in addition to the statistical analysis of the effects of actual
arbitration and other dispute resolution ichanisms, there have been several
laboratory experiments of how the various mechanisms affect behavior (see Table
17). These studies, while by no means conclusive, have tended to support the
claim that final offer arbitration has less of a chilling effect on negotiations
than does conventional arbitration and gives some evidence that both have some
similar effects.65
Table 17: Results of Laboratory Experiments
of Impasse Resolution Procedures
Study Finding
1. Johnson and Tullar Expected third—party resolution leads
to bargaining when "Need to save face" is
high.
2. Bigoness Expected compulsory arbitration impedes
bargaining if high conflict between
sides.
3. Urban Expected conventional arbitration leads
to nre time to reach agreement.
4.Johnsonand Pruitt Less time to reach agreement.
5. DeNisi and Dworkin More information about final offer pro-
cedures leads to closer agreements.
6. Notz and Starke Final offer reduces difference in
negotiations. Conventional
arbitration increases differences.
7. Subbarao Final offer leads to smaller dif-
ferences in negotiating than
conventional arbitration does.
8. Magenau Allowing strikes is more effective than
arbitration in producing voluntary
agreements. Final offer leads to
greater narrowing of differences than
conventional arbitration.66
VII. CONCLUSION:UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
As the preceding review and summary of findings shows, much has been
learnedabout public sector labor relations. Much also remains to be learned.
Wage studies covering nre recent periods of time are likely to produce dif-
ferent estimates than those covering earlier periods, leading to different
overall conclusions about the power of public sector unions. Additional analy-
sis of the legal and political environment under which unionism operates should
illuminate the unique aspects of public sector labor relations.
Perhaps what is most sorely needed in this area of research is a general
analytic framework around which the diverse research studies can be organized to
answer questions regarding the unique aspects of public sector labor relations.
For the most part, researchers have applied the same basic analytic framework
used in the private sector, concentrating on wage and other compensation effects
of collective bargaining. If the analysis in this review essay is correct, this
misses much that is unique about the public sector in terms of both positive and
normative economics. Whereas in the private sector one can infer employment
declines from union—induced wage increases, this does not appear to be valid in
the public sector because of union potential to shift demand outward through the
political process.
As a general guide, models in which public sector unions affect demand for
labor rather than just wages, and influence the entire budget and tax position
of cities and states appear to offer the best hope for understanding what public
sector unions do and of allowing a social evaluation of what the advent of
unionism to the public sector nans for the United States econony.67
Appendix A: The Measurement of the Extent of Collective Bargaining
Because public sector unions operate under different state laws, the
definition of "unionism" is by- no ians clear. Existing data provide several
widely used sets of figures, which are described below:
(i)Membership in a Bargaining Organization
The term "bargaining organization" was coined by Burton (in Aaron, Grodin,
and Stern) to include unions and bargaining associations (or what BLS calls
employee associations). Burton divides public sector organizations into three
classes: unions, bargaining associations, and nonbargaining organizations.
Unions are characterized by strike endorsement, emphasis on collective
bargaining, exclusion of supervisors from membership, and AFL—CIO affiliation.
Bargaining associations also rely on collective bargaining, but are generally
averse to strikes, are more likely to emphasize political action instead,
usually include supervisors, and are affiliated with AFL—CIO. The National
Education Association (NEA) is an example. Finally, non—bargaining organiza-
tions don't bargain as a group, don't strike, are not affiliated with AFL—CIO,
but generally include supervisors as members. An example is the American Bar
Association (ABA). Bureau of Labor Statistics data was used by Burton to esti—
mate this figure. According to Burton, a shortcoming of the BLS data is that it
underestimates coverage by excluding municipal public employee associations.
Other problems are that BLS includes msmbership outside the US as well as
retired and unemployed workers. Post 19T9 the Bureau of National Affairs has
kept this series.
(2) Membership in an Employee Organization
The Bureau of the Census, Department of Labor (BCDL) defines an employee68
organization as "an organization (e.g., union, association, federation, or coun-
cil) that exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with the
employer concerning personnel policies and practices, employee grievaces, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other conditions of
work." The data is available only as the percent of full—time employees and
exists from l9T1 to the present.
(3) Employees Represented by Bargaining Units
The BCDL defines a bargaining unit as a group recognized as appropriate for
representation by an employee organization for the purpose of collective and/or
meet and confer discussions. Units commonly include both member and nonmembers
of the organization.
(1) Employees Covered by Contractual Agreement
The BCDL defines a contractual agreement as "a written document developed
by collective negotiations between representatives of the employer and employee
organizations that describes the conditions of employment (e.g., wages, hours,
fringe benefits, etc.) and the methods by which disputes or grievances arising
during the term of the contract shall be resolved.
(5)EmployeesRepresented by Labor Organizations (CPS)
CPS includes both members of unions and employer associations engaged in
collective bargaining as well as those covered by a union or employee association
contract. No retirees, unemployed union members, or persons in the armed forces
are included. Moreover, it includes members only in the United States. A njor
problem, however, is that while the CPS reports "government" workers as part of
its "Class of Worker" question, it breaks up the government into state, federal,
and local only for those workers in public administration.69
Thefollowing figures provide some notion of the range of figures one gets
from different surveys:
State and Local Employees 1976 1980
1. %ofemployees with bargaining 37% ——
organizationmembership (ELS)
2. %offull—time employees 149.8 148.8
with employee organization
membership (BcDL)
3. %ofall employees represented 35.8 38.14
by bargaining units (BCDL)
14.%ofemployees covered by contra— 27.7 32.1
ctual agreement (BCDL)
5. %representedby labor organiza-
tions (cPs)70
Notes
1.The Meany quote is from Leo Kramer, Labor's Paradox —theAmerican
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL—CIO (Wiley,
1962), p. 141. One estimate for the percent of yorkers organized in unions
in the government sector is 13 percent. Burton, "The Extent of Collective
Bargaining in the Public Sector," pp. 2—3. However, few of these workers
had contracts.
2.See Appendix A for other estimates of collective bargaining coverage.
3.39 states have such legislation. U.S. Department of Labor,
Labor—Management Services Administration, SummaryofPublic Sector Labor
Relations Policies, 1980, p. V.
14.Bureau of Labor Statisics, Earnings and Other Characteristics of Organized
Workers,Ma1980 (Bulletin 2105), table IT.
5.Thetwospecializedjournals arethe Government Union Review, and the
Journalof Collective Negotiations." The bibliography to this paper shows
thegrowth of research articles.
6.Because of differences in the data and in the fine line between
associations and unions, these and other statements about the growth of
public sector unions are approximations.
7. See Burton, p.8.
8. SeeSteiber, p. 117.
9.See Mitchell, p. 130
10. Jonathan Brock, Bargaining Beyond Impasse, pp. 27—29.
11.314 states (including Washington, D.C.) have some kind of employee
relations board. Calculated from "Sunimary of Public Sector Labor Relations
Policies," 1981.
12. See U.S. Bureau of Census.
13. Wellington and Winter, The Unions and the Cities, p. 15 and 30.
114. Wellington and Winter, p. 15 and 30.
15. According to the Massachusetts Teachers Association, the years were
January 19T9to July1976.
i6.Labor Management Relations Service, The Role of Politics in Local Labor
Relations,p. 8.
17. Lewin, D. "Public Sector Labor Relations," Labor History, Winter 1977, p.
138.71
18. Mitchell, D.J.B., Public Personnel Management, March—April 1978, p. 89.
19.See Freeman, Ichniowski, and Lauer; Ehrenberg and Goldstein; Chambers.
20. Munnell, "Who Should Manage the Assets of Collectively Bargained Pension
Plans?" p. 19.
21. For example, studies which show large effects on the minimum are Feulile,
Hendricks, and Delaney; Wasylenko; Kearney—Morgan; and Ichniowski. Studies
which find larger effects on the maximumareHall—Vanderporten and
Bartel-Lewin.
22. AFL—CIO News,
23. These beliefs were based on Depression and World War II experiences.
— ,. ,. an yn - ---v._n ,- - -, +. X.D. rreemananu J.i.rieuoII,wnat cio UnionsiiObasic1300Kb, JQL4•
25.Zax, pp. l1ii4_1T
26.Benecki, for general municipal services in all but thevery largestcities.
Gallagher, on teacher's budgets. Feuille et.al. for police budgets; Zax,
for all municipal groups.
27. Methe and Perry-, p. 368.
28.Stanley, p. 3.
29. Levitan and Noden, p.138.
30. On the basis ofBenecki'slimited calculations, a complete analysis of
union effects might be expected to show greater revenue per capita, higher pro-
perty taxes, higher sales taxes, but lower user charge revenue in unionized
municipalities and lower debt. Because Benecki finds different patterns for
large cities than for other, does not obtain internally consistent results in
all cases and includes "three institutional bargaining variables"
likelyto have affected his estimates of union impacts, I regard his findings as
only suggestive. They are, however, valuable inraisingthe possibility that a
majorresearch payoff could come from the proper analysis of union impacts on
broadly defined municipal finances.
31.Calculatedfrom Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1971and1983.
32.Wheeler, Stern, and Olson; Rodgers; Ichniowski; Fallon; Horn; McGuire and
Tomkiewicz.
33.For NewJersey, seeBloom or Ashenfelter and Bloom. For Massachusetts, see
Lipsky and Barocci or Somers.72
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